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Abstract
In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players | allowing players to
be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that \better" responses are chosen with probabilities at
least as high as those of \worse" responses | most of Thompson's \inessential" transformations
for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only
two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves,
and replacing a ¯nal move by nature by simply taking expected payo®s.
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11. Introduction
In a classic paper | a semi-o±cial status, since it was reprinted in Kuhn's (1997) \Classics
in Game Theory" | Thompson (1952) shows that if two extensive form games have the same
strategic form (up to duplicated pure strategies), then one may be transformed into the other
via repeated application of what Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, p. 1008) refer to as \completely
inessential" transformations of the game tree: these transformations leave the strategic features
of the game una®ected. They continue to argue that such elementary transformations
\...are irrelevant for correct decision making: after all, the transformed tree is
merely a di®erent presentation of the same decision problem, and decision theory
should not be misled by presentation e®ects. We contend that to hold the opposite
point of view is to admit that decision theory is useless in real-life applications..."
(Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, p. 1011).
This is a perfectly sound basis for the study of the stability and re¯nement of Nash equilibria
under the assumption of rational behavior of the players. On the other hand, one of the major
lessons from behavioral game theory is that di®erent ways to tell the same story do matter if
players are less rational. See for instance Tversky and Kahneman (1986) on framing.
So do these transformations really remain `inessential' if explicit models of bounded ratio-
nality are considered? The current note investigates the e®ect of these transformations on one
of the most commonly used classes of solution concepts for boundedly rational players in non-
cooperative games: the family of quantal response equilibria (QRE), where the assumption of
expected utility maximization is replaced by probabilistic choice models. In these models, play-
ers are imperfect optimizers, but at least play \better" responses with probabilities not lower
than \worse" responses.2 Two properties of the family of quantal response equilibria that are
of importance in our analysis are:
[QRE1] Every action is chosen with positive probability.3
[QRE2] In every information set, the choice probabilities are de¯ned in terms of
and are weakly increasing in conditional expected payo®s.
These properties are formalized in Section 2.2; Goeree et al. (2006) impose somewhat stronger
conditions in their de¯nition of regular QRE. The most frequently used QRE apply the logit
2Rosenthal (1989) and Voorneveld (2005) study properties of one of the ¯rst concepts within this literature;
the variant using the logit model was introduced in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998). Numerous experimental
studies (cf. Camerer, 2003, Goeree and Holt, 2001) indicate that QRE have substantial descriptive power.


















Figure 1: A simple extensive form game
choice model, well-known from pioneering contributions of McFadden (1974), where choice prob-
abilities are proportional to a simple exponential function of the associated expected payo®s.
For instance, in the two-player game in Figure 1, conditional on being in his information set,
player 2 receives payo® u2(b) from moving left and u2(c) from moving right. Thus, in a logit








with parameter ¸ ¸ 0. This parameter is used in experiments to ¯t the data and provides
a rough indication of `rationality': at ¸ = 0, players randomize uniformly over their options
without taking payo®s into account, whereas the quantal response equilibria select a subset of
the game's Nash equilibria as the parameter ¸ goes to in¯nity (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998,
Thm. 4). Logit QRE are used throughout the note for the purpose of illustration.
Incidental observations on the violation of strategic equivalence in the context of logit QRE
have been made before; see McKelvey and Palfrey (1998, pp. 18-19), discussed in greater detail
in Section 3.1 below. Yet, to our knowledge, this note is the ¯rst4 to provide (a) a full treatment
of strategic equivalence by systematically going through all of the Thompson transformations
(and two additional ones by Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986), and (b) to do so for an entire family
of solution concepts for boundedly rational players, assuming only [QRE1] and [QRE2].
The remainder is set up as follows. Although the main points of this note require little or no
formal de¯nitions, standard notation for extensive form games and quantal response equilibria
4For instance, the books on behavioral economics by Kagel and Roth (1995) and Camerer (2003) do not
mention Thompson (1952) at all.
3is contained in Section 2. Section 3 shows by means of simple examples that most of the
transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games do a®ect quantal response
equilibria in a nontrivial way and | in the logit case | may select decidedly di®erent Nash
equilibria in the limiting case as the parameter ¸ goes to in¯nity. Only two transformations of
Thompson (1952) and Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) remain truly inessential: the interchange
of moves | roughly stating that if two consecutive players move in ignorance of one another's
choice, the order of their choices is irrelevant | and replacing a ¯nal move by nature by simply
taking expected payo®s. Section 4 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Notation
2.1. Extensive form games
The notation follows, with minor changes, Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, section 11.1). A
(¯nite) extensive form game ¡ has the following components:
² A nonempty, ¯nite set of players N.
² A ¯nite set H of sequences satisfying:
{ the empty sequence ;, interpreted as the starting point of the game, lies in H;
{ if (a1;:::;aK) 2 H and L < K, then (a1;:::;aL) 2 H.
Elements of H are histories; each component of a history is an action taken by a player.
History (a1;:::;aK) 2 H is terminal if there is no aK+1 such that (a1;:::;aK;aK+1) 2 H.
The set of terminal histories is denoted by Z ½ H. The set of actions available after
a nonterminal history h is denoted by A(h) = fa : (h;a) 2 Hg.
² A player function P : H nZ ! N [f0g assigning to each nonterminal history h 2 H nZ
the player P(h) 2 N [f0g who takes an action after history h. If P(h) = 0, chance/nature
determines the action.
² For each history h 2 H n Z with P(h) = 0 a probability distribution f0(¢ j h) over A(h)
specifying for each a 2 A(h) the probability f0(a j h) that nature chooses a.
² For each player i 2 N a partition Ii of fh 2 H nZ : P(h) = ig with A(h) = A(h0) if h and
h0 lie in the same member of the partition. An element Ii 2 Ii is an information set of
player i. Since i has the same actions in all h 2 Ii, the set of actions A(Ii) in information
set Ii is well-de¯ned.
4² For each player i 2 N a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui : Z ! R.
We assume perfect recall: if histories h;h0 lie in the same information set of player i, the
sequence of player i's information sets encountered along these histories and the actions that i
took there are identical. Informally: in an information set, player i remembers exactly which of
his own information sets he passed, and what he did there.
A behavioral strategy ¯i of player i 2 N is a collection of (independent) probability dis-
tributions (¯i(Ii))Ii2Ii assigning to each of his information sets Ii 2 Ii a probability distribution
over his available actions A(Ii).
Let h = (a1;:::;aK) 2 H and let ¯ = (¯i)i2N be a behavioral strategy pro¯le. The
probability of reaching h using ¯, i.e., the product of the probabilities that the initial player
P(;) chooses a1 and that for each k = 1;:::;K ¡1, player P(a1;:::;ak) chooses action ak+1, is
denoted by Pr(h j ¯).
If h is not a terminal history, there are continuations of the form c = (c1;:::;cL) (with
L 2 N) from h to a terminal history (h;c) = (a1;:::;aK;c1;:::;cL) 2 Z. Denote the set of
continuations from h to a terminal history by
C(h) = fc : (h;c) 2 Zg:
Conditional upon being in h, the probability of continuation c = (c1;:::;cL) 2 C(h) using ¯,
i.e., the product of the probabilities that player P(h) chooses c1 and that for each ` = 1;:::;L¡1,
player P(h;c1;:::;c`) chooses action c`+1, is denoted by Pr(c j ¯;h). For notational convenience,
if h is a terminal history itself, we de¯ne its unique continuation to be the empty sequence ;
with corresponding probability one:
h 2 Z ) C(h) := f;g and Pr(; j ¯;h) := 1:
2.2. Quantal response equilibria
We start by formalizing properties [QRE1] and [QRE2] from the introduction.
[QRE1] For each QRE ¯, each i 2 N, each Ii 2 Ii, each a 2 A(Ii): ¯i(Ii)(a) > 0.
This implies that all information sets are reached with positive probability. Hence, if i 2 N
believes to be in information set Ii 2 Ii, he can determine the probability of being in any of its
histories h 2 Ii via Bayes' law. The conditional expected payo® from choosing a 2 A(Ii) is









The requirement that the choice probabilities in information sets are de¯ned in terms of and are
weakly increasing in conditional expected payo®s can be formalized as follows:
5[QRE2] Fix two games ¡;¡0 with player set N. Suppose there is:
(i) for each i 2 N a bijection ' : Ii ! I0
i between i's information sets and
(ii) for each Ii 2 Ii a bijection Ã : A(Ii) ! A0('(Ii)) between i's feasible actions
in ¡ and ¡0, respectively. Then every completely mixed behavioral strategy pro¯le
¯ in ¡ yields an isomorphic strategy pro¯le ¯0 in ¡0 de¯ned by:
8i 2 N;8Ii 2 Ii;8a 2 A(Ii) : ¯0
i('(Ii))(Ã(a)) := ¯i(Ii)(a):
If these give identical conditional expected payo®s in all information sets, i.e.,
8i 2 N;8Ii 2 Ii;8a 2 A(Ii) : E[ui j Ii;¯;a] = E[u0
i j '(Ii);¯0;Ã(a)];
then ¡ and ¡0 have identical QRE, up to isomorphism:
¯ is a QRE of ¡ , ¯0 is a QRE of ¡0:
Moreover, if ¯ is a QRE of ¡, then, for all a;b 2 A(Ii):
E[ui j Ii;¯;a] ¸ E[ui j Ii;¯;b] ) ¯i(Ii)(a) ¸ ¯i(Ii)(b):
The most familiar member of the family of QRE uses logit choice probabilities (McFadden, 1974).
Consider a game ¡ and a parameter ¸ 2 [0;1). A logit quantal response equilibrium of ¡
is a completely mixed behavioral strategy pro¯le ¯ with choice probabilities de¯ned as follows:
8i 2 N;8Ii 2 Ii;8a 2 A(Ii) : ¯i(Ii)(a) =
exp¸E[ui j Ii;¯;a]
P
b2A(Ii) exp¸E[ui j Ii;¯;b]
:
3. Transformations
3.1. Addition of a super°uous move
The second game in Figure 2 is obtained from the ¯rst by applying Thompson's `addition
of a super°uous move'. Player 2 is given an additional decision point in his information set,
but the move there is irrelevant: it does not a®ect the outcome (no matter what 2 does, the
game ends with outcome a). The games' QRE, however, will typically be a®ected in a nontrivial
way: by [QRE2], the choice probability in player 2's information set is de¯ned in terms of
his expected payo® there. Conditional on being in his information set, 2's expected payo® of
moving left before the transformation is u2(b), whereas after the transformation, it will be a
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Figure 2: Addition of a super°uous move
Assigning payo®s u1(a) = u2(a) = 2;u1(b) = u2(b) = 0;u1(c) = 3;u2(c) = 1, McKelvey and
Palfrey (1998, pp. 18-19) show that the logit QRE of these two games yield qualitatively di®erent
results: the logit QRE in the ¯rst game is unique (for every ¸ ¸ 0), whereas the second game
allows multiple QRE for given parameter values ¸. Indeed, in the latter case, for large values
of ¸, there is an additional component of QRE converging to a subgame imperfect equilibrium.
Nevertheless, the principal branch of the logit QRE manifold in both representations eventually
selects the subgame perfect equilibrium where 1 moves left and 2 moves right.
But the di®erences can be even more dramatic. Suppose, for instance, that
u1(a) = u1(b) > u1(c) and u2(b) > u2(c): (1)
Let ¸ ¸ 0. If p(¸);q(¸) 2 [0;1] denote the probability of player 1 and 2 moving left, respectively,












1 + e¸(1¡q(¸))(u1(c)¡u1(a)): (3)
For every ¸ ¸ 0, (2) ¯xes q(¸), which in its turn via (3) ¯xes p(¸): the logit QRE given ¸ is
unique. Moreover, given (1), we have
lim
¸!1
(p(¸);q(¸)) = (1=2;1); (4)
i.e., as ¸ ! 1, the principal branch of the logit QRE manifold selects the Nash equilibrium
where player 1 mixes uniformly and player 2 moves left (proof in Appendix). The logit QRE of
the second game, however, behave considerably more capriciously. We consider two examples.
Figure 3 contains the graph of the choice probabilities p(¸) in the game's logit QRE if
ui(a) = ui(b) = 1;ui(c) = 0 for both i = 1;2. Plot discontinuities are due to approximations.








Figure 3: The choice probability p(¸) in logit QRE of a symmetric game.








Figure 4: The choice probabilities p(¸) (black) and q(¸) (grey) in logit QRE.
By symmetry, the graph of q(¸) is similar. This shows not only that there are multiple logit
QRE for large values of ¸, but also that there is a bifurcation: there is no principal branch. Parts
of the QRE correspondence converge to di®erent Nash equilibria: (1;1), (1=2;1), and (1;1=2).
Figure 4 contains the graphs of the choice probabilities p(¸) (black) and q(¸) (grey) in the
game's logit QRE if u1(a) = u1(b) = 5;u1(c) = u2(c) = 0;u2(a) = 2;u2(b) = 4. Again, there are
multiple logit QRE for large values of ¸, but now the principal branch converges to the Nash
equilibrium (1;1=2), di®erent from the limiting equilibrium (4) before the transformation.
3.2. Coalescing of information sets
Consider the two games in Figure 5. In the ¯rst game, player 2 moves twice in a row if
he initially goes right. In the second game, these consecutive moves are contracted to a single
8one by giving the second player two new actions that can be interpreted as `¯rst right, then
left' and `twice right', respectively. This is an example of the transformation `coalescing of
information sets'. Player 2 is indi®erent between his actions. By weak monotonicity [QRE2],
in a quantal response equilibrium, player 2 chooses each of his actions with equal probability.







































































he prefers to move left in the ¯rst game, but right in the second. By weak monotonicity [QRE2],
the probability of moving left is at least 1=2 in the ¯rst and at most 1=2 in the second game. In


















in the second game. These probabilities move in di®erent directions: although both equal 1
2 if
¸ = 0, p(¸) increases to one, whereas ^ p(¸) decreases to zero as ¸ ! 1.
3.3. Interchange of moves
The idea behind the interchange of moves is that if one player has no information about
the other player's action when making his choice, the order of play is irrelevant. The standard
example is that a two-player, simultaneous-move game can be represented in extensive form
in two equivalent ways: either as a game where player 1 moves ¯rst and player 2 moves next,
9unaware of what 1 did, or conversely, as a game where player 2 moves ¯rst and player 1 moves
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Figure 6: Interchange of moves: representations of a \Stag-Hunt" game
The interchange of moves de¯ned in the Appendix allows slightly more general cases, but
the idea remains the same: since two consecutive players act in total ignorance of one another's
choices, they act on the same information in both cases. Expected payo®s are not a®ected and
therefore, by [QRE2], the transformation is truly inessential:
Theorem 3.1 The interchange of moves leaves the quantal response equilibria of an extensive
form game una®ected.
The proof is in the Appendix.
3.4. Three more transformations
Elmes and Reny (1994) show that Thompson's ¯nal transformation, in°ation/de°ation, can
be dispensed with under our assumption of perfect recall. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, pp.
1008-1009) suggest two more transformations. Firstly:
\...whenever a move by nature leads only to terminal nodes, it is equivalent to a
terminal node with the corresponding expected payo®s."
This transformation leaves the expected payo®s of a player's actions in a given information set
unchanged and therefore, by [QRE2], does not a®ect the quantal response equilibria. Secondly:
\...in an information set that is followed by no other information set, one may add
or delete moves that lead in e®ect to a lottery between other moves."
This transformation is far from innocent. Consider the second game in Figure 5 and suppose
that u1(b) < u1(d) < u1(c): player 2's third action is equivalent to a suitably chosen lottery
10between the ¯rst two. Removing the third action gives Figure 7. By [QRE2], since player 2 is
indi®erent between his actions, he will choose them with equal probability in a QRE. If player
















this means that player 1 prefers to move right in the game before the transformation and to
move left after the transformation. In particular, in the logit QRE, the probabilities of moving
left in the initial history move in opposite directions: both equal 1
2 if ¸ = 0, but as ¸ ! 1, the


















Figure 7: Removing convex combinations
4. Concluding remarks
Under weak assumptions [QRE1] and [QRE2] on a large family of solution concepts for
boundedly rational players, we have shown that only two of the usual `inessential' transfor-
mations of Thompson (1952) and Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) remain truly inessential: the
interchange of moves, and replacing a ¯nal move by nature by simply taking expected payo®s.
The essential assumption is [QRE2]: in an information set, only expected payo®s matter. And
\better" responses are chosen with probabilities not lower than \worse" responses. Condition
[QRE1], requiring the behavioral strategies to be completely mixed, guarantees that all informa-
tion sets are reached with positive probability and that Bayes' law can be applied to compute
the conditional probabilities of the di®erent histories in an information set. In all our coun-
terexamples to show that transformations were far from inessential, however, information sets
were either singletons or reached with probability one, so requirement [QRE1] was not necessary.
This means that our counterexamples also serve to show the relevance of such transformations in
members of the QRE family where actions may be chosen with probability zero, like in Rosenthal
(1989) and Voorneveld (2005).
11The e®ect of certain transformations on choice probabilities in our probabilistic choice models
has a counterpart in the discrete choice models from microeconometrics by which the QRE are
inspired. The distortional e®ect of coalescing of moves is one of the main motivations for
considering nested/hierarchical discrete choice models (cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985, Ch.
10, Train, 2003, Ch. 4). The distortional e®ect of taking away/adding convex combinations of
moves and in particular replicas of existing options is an example of Debreu's (1960) well-known
red-bus-blue-bus paradox.
Appendix
Proof of (4): Since u2(c) ¡ u2(b) < 0, it follows from (2) that lim¸!1 q(¸) = 1. Since
u1(c) ¡ u1(b) = u1(c) ¡ u1(a) < 0, the power series expansion of the exponential function gives:

























! 0 as ¸ ! 1:
Since lim¸!1 ¸(1 ¡ q(¸))(u1(c) ¡ u1(a)) = 0, it follows from (3) that lim¸!1 p(¸) = 1
2.
Interchange of moves: We follow Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 208).5 Let ¡ be an
extensive form game. Suppose there are players i;j 2 N and information sets Ii 2 Ii;Ij 2 Ij
capturing the following: there is a nonempty set H0 µ Ii of histories in i's information set such
that the next player to move is player j, who is completely unaware of what i did:
H0 = fh0 2 Ii : (h0;a) 2 Ij for all a 2 A(h0)g:
The set of histories in Ij reached in this way is
H00 = f(h0;a) 2 Ij : h0 2 H0;a 2 A(h0)g:
5Thompson (1952) and Elmes and Reny (1994) de¯ne the transformation only for cases where both players
have two-alternative moves; Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) do not impose this restriction.
12Then ¡ is equivalent to the extensive form game where:
² The set of histories is changed as follows. For every h0 2 H0, a 2 A(h), b 2 A(h0;a),
c 2 C(h0;a;b):
{ histories of the form (h0;a) are replaced by histories of the form (h0;b),
{ histories of the form (h0;a;b) are replaced by histories of the form (h0;b;a),
{ histories of the form (h0;a;b;c) are replaced by histories of the form (h0;b;a;c).
² The information set Ii of player i is replaced by the information set
I0
i = (Ii n H0) [ f(h0;b) : h0 2 H;b 2 A(Ij)g; (5)
² The information set Ij of player j is replaced by the information set
I0
j = (Ij n H00) [ H0:
² Of course, the corresponding changes in information sets, player function, etc., are mostly
cosmetic: the only relevant change is that now player j moves in his new information set
I0
j before player i does so in his new information set I0
i.
Proof of Thm. 3.1: Consider an extensive form game ¡ and suppose that moves of players i
and j were interchanged in the way described above. Since the only information sets that were
changed in a non-trivial way are Ii and Ij, it su±ces to prove that the conditions for quantal
response equilibrium at these information sets are una®ected. Moreover, since one gets back the
original game by once again interchanging the moves of i and j, the player roles are symmetric,
so it su±ces to prove this for the information set of one of these players only, say player i.
Finally, by [QRE2], it su±ces to show that the expected payo® for every action a¤ 2 A(Ii) is
the same in both games. So let a¤ 2 A(Ii).
Partition Ii into H0 and the (possibly empty) set of remaining histories R := Ii n H0. Let
Aj := A(Ij) be the set of actions available to player j in information set Ij and consequently
also in I0
j. Let ¯ = (¯i)i2N be a pro¯le of completely mixed behavioral strategies in ¡. With
a minor abuse of notation, this is also a pro¯le of behavioral strategies in the game after the
interchange transformation, where player k 2 fi;jg applies probability distribution ¯k(Ik) to
the actions in the new information set I0
k.
Player i's expected payo® from a¤ in the games before and after the interchange of moves is:
Case 1, conditional upon being in Ii: Conditioning on the histories in Ii and computing
the expected payo® from all relevant continuations (divided into the ¯rst move by j and possible




~ h2Ii Pr(~ hj¯)
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c2C(h0;a¤;b) ¯j(Ij)(b) Pr(c j ¯;(h0;a¤;b))ui(h0;a¤;b;c):
Case 2, conditional upon being in I0
i: By (5), the probability of reaching I0
i is
P




h02H0 ¯j(Ij)(b)Pr(h0 j ¯) =
P







h02H0 Pr(h0 j ¯) =
P
~ h2Ii Pr(~ h j ¯);
just like in Case 1. By (5), conditioning on histories in I0
i and computing the expected payo®




~ h2Ii Pr(~ hj¯)
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~ h2Ii Pr(~ hj¯)
P
c2C(h0;a¤;b) Pr(c j ¯;(h0;a¤;b))ui(h0;a¤;b;c);
which is | after rearranging terms | identical to the expression in Case 1.
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